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We examine the impact of stock exchange trading rules and surveillance on the frequency 
and severity of suspected insider trading cases in 22 stock exchanges around the world over the 
period January 2003 through June 2011. Using new indices for market manipulation, insider 
trading, and broker-agency conflict based on the specific provisions of the trading rules of each 
stock exchange, along with surveillance to detect non-compliance with such rules, we show that 
more detailed exchange trading rules and surveillance over time and across markets significantly 
reduce the number of cases, but increase the profits per case.   
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This paper addresses a central question at the intersection of law and finance: are rules 
and their enforcement effective at mitigating insider trading? Our approach differs from prior 
work in three important ways. First, for the first time, we examine exchange trading rules that 
govern market conduct and relate these rules to insider trading. Second, we use recent changes in 
such rules that resulted from European directives to explore time series variation in the structure 
of exchange trading rules pertinent to insider trading and market manipulation. These changes 
were mandated by the European Commission and were not enacted in response to market 
manipulation problems in any one country per se, thereby giving rise to a natural experiment 
with which to study the effectiveness of exchange trading rules. Third, we employ unique 
surveillance data in relation to insider trading and market manipulation. The surveillance data are 
based on alerts, or computer algorithms, used by surveillance authorities to detect instances or 
patterns of market manipulation. Our surveillance data cover a wide range of market 
manipulation and are used by sophisticated surveillance authorities to detect cross-product and 
cross-market manipulation.  Unlike other studies on the impact of securities regulation, published 
and otherwise, we study the extent and timing of enforcement by considering surveillance. 
 
We do not consider actual successful prosecutions of insider trading, but rather, suspected 
cases of insider trading. We distinguish between insider trading ahead of announcements from 
clear cases of market anticipation and thereby use data on suspected cases of insider trading 
applied by expert surveillance authorities in their ex post data analyses and assessment of market 
quality. Our analysis involves monthly data from 22 exchanges in 17 countries, including 3 
 
Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the 
United States (US) for the period January 2003 through June 2011. Insider trading data are 
compiled by the joint organizations Capital Market Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC),
1 
SIRCA,
2 and SMARTS Group Inc.
3 These organizations have both research and commercial 
interests in surveillance activities on many stock exchanges around the world. 
 
An important aspect of this study involves the broad nature of insider trading and its 
detection. Insider trading can be facilitated by forms of market manipulation that are not, strictly 
speaking, by themselves insider trading. For example, spoofing, which involves giving up 
priority, switches, and layering of bids/asks, can be used to further illegal insider trades by 
creating other market distortions that would make insider trading more difficult to detect. 
Similarly, volume manipulation through churning and wash trades can likewise make the 
detection of insider trading more difficult. Therefore, the ability of an exchange to mitigate 
insider trading activity and profits from insider trading depend significantly on the overall rule 
structure of the exchange and the ability of the exchange to detect manipulation through 
domestic and cross-market surveillance. 
 
An equally important aspect of this study is the difference between exchange trading 
rules and surveillance. Exchange trading rules are unambiguous and purposely made obvious to 
                                                 
     
1  http://www.cmcrc.com/  
     
2  http://www.sirca.org.au/display/SBX/Home  
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market participants, and they are very visible on each exchange’s webpage. Surveillance 
activities, by contrast, are not made obvious, but can be estimated by market participants. If 
market participants knew exactly which computer algorithms were, or were not used, by 
surveillance authorities to alert them of breaches of trading rules, they could tailor their trades to 
avoid detection. Rules and surveillance together, therefore, have the potential to mitigate the 
perpetration of market manipulation or to exacerbate the profits from such manipulation 
according to the Becker (1968) economic model of crime (commit a crime if the expected 
benefits exceed the costs; see also Garfinkel and Nimalndran, 2003; Karpoff et al., 2008a,b, 
2012; Brockman et al., 2009; Baker et al., 2010; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Yu and Yu, 2011). 
 
Based on the unique, and in some dimensions proprietary, data set in this study, we 
uncover a non-trivial role for exchange trading rules and surveillance in mitigating the number of 
insider trading cases, but exacerbating the profits per case. In our most conservative estimates, a 
1-standard-deviation improvement in trading rule specificity gives rise to a 23.43% reduction in 
the number of insider trading cases and a 53.17% increase in profits per case. These findings are 
robust to numerous specifications, including but not limited to difference-in-differences 
regressions and two-stage instrumental variables regressions. Similarly, we conservatively 
estimate that a 1-standard-deviation improvement in surveillance gives rise to a 67.0% reduction 
in the number of cases and 26.3% increase in profits per case.  Overall, the findings highlight 
complementarities across different trading rules and surveillance, and these complementarities 
are at least twice as important as stand-alone insider trading rules for predicting the frequency of 
insider trading cases; however, the complementarities are less economically important for 5 
 
predicting the trading value for surrounding the insider trading cases relative to stand-alone 
insider trading rules. 
 
This paper is related to a substantial body of work in securities regulation that explores 
the question of whether securities laws and their enforcement facilitate more efficient markets 
with greater integrity. For instance, recent studies have shown a positive empirical link between 
securities regulation and capital raising (La Porta et al., 2006; Roe, 2006; Jackson, 2007; Jackson 
and Roe, 2009), and liquidity (Cumming et al., 2011).
4 More specifically in the area of insider 
trading however, the evidence is more varied and generally shows that insider trading laws are 
relatively less effective (the Appendix provides an overview of related papers). Bris (2005) 
studies the adoption of insider trading laws across 54 countries from the 1960s through the 1990s 
and finds some evidence that such laws fail to mitigate the number of cases while increasing 
profits per case. Similarly, Beny (2005, 2007) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002, 2009) find 
evidence that insider trading laws do more harm than good when they are not properly enforced. 
The present paper complements this literature by examining, for the first time, whether 
surveillance (computer-based alerts based on algorithms) and exchange trading rules across 
countries and time mitigate insider trading activity. Our findings strongly support this prior work 
                                                 
     
4  See also, e.g., Aggarwal (2001), Aggarwal and Wu (2006), Allen and Gale (1992), Allen and Gorton 
(1992), Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), Daouk et al. (2006), DeMarzo et al. (2005), Gerard and Nanda (1993), 
Hillion and Suominen (2004), Jarrow (1992, 1994), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006), Mahoney 
(1999), Merrick et al. (2005), Ni et al. (2005), Peng and Röell (2009), O’Hara and Mendiola (2003), Pirrong (1993, 
1995a,b, 1999, 2004), Pistor et al. (2003), Pistor and Xu (2003, 2005), Prichard (2003), Reiffen and Robe (2007), 
Romano (2001, 2002). 6 
 
and extend the literature by highlighting the effect of different yet complementary market 
manipulation rules and specific direct policy mechanisms directly relevant to insider trading. 
 
  This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes stock exchange trading rules and 
exchange surveillance. The data are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents multivariate 
analyses of the relation between the frequency and profitability of insider trading and exchange 
trading rules and surveillance. Concluding remarks are set forth in Section 5. 
 
2. Expected impact of exchange trading rule complementarities on insider trading 
 
  Traditional studies of the impact of rules on insider trading have considered specific 
exchange trading rules pertaining to insider trading and governance (e.g., Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002, 2009; Beny, 2005, 2007; Bris, 2005; see the Appendix). Our perspective is similar, 
but with three important differences. First, we conjecture that there are myriad exchange trading 
rules specific to insider trading that impact the frequency and severity of such trading. Second, 
we consider that non-insider trading exchange trading rules influence insider trading through rule 
complementarities. Finally, we believe that surveillance efforts directed towards these first two 
issues affect insider trading. We explain in this section each of these three points in turn prior to 
introducing the data and tests in the subsequent sections. 
 7 
 
2.1. Insider trading rules 
 
Insider trading, which generally refers to trading on material non-public information, is 
far from generic. Insider trading can be propagated through many different channels and brought 
about by different market participants. As a result, exchange trading rules regarding client 
precedence, front-running, trading ahead of research reports, separation of research and trading, 
broker ownership limits, restrictions on affiliation, restrictions on communications, investment 
company securities, influencing or rewarding the employees of others, and anti-
intimidation/coordination could all potentially have an impact on the frequency and severity of 
insider trading. 
 
Two types of rule affect the ability of brokers to impact trading on material non-public 
information: client precedence and front-running. Client precedence refers to brokers violating 
the time priority of client orders. A client precedence rule is violated during insider trading when 
a broker initiates a trade on his own account shortly ahead of the execution of a client's order, 
with the client’s trade being executed at a worse price. Front-running likewise refers to brokers 
trading ahead of client orders. In the case of front-running, upon receipt of a large client order, a 
broker trades shortly prior to the client's order, with the expectation that the client's order will 
move the price. Front-running can also involve brokers who, after receiving a client's order, take 
the opposite position to the client's order in the market without the client’s knowledge and then, 
immediately thereafter, the same broker crosses with the same client off-market at a profit. 
 8 
 
Other forms of insider trading can involve the use of material non-public information 
about the company being traded. Trading rules can mitigate the incidence of this form of insider 
trading by prohibiting trading ahead of the public release of research reports created by 
brokerages, and the separation of research and trading departments at brokerages (commonly 
referred to as “Chinese Walls”). As well, rules that limit affiliation between exchange members 
and member companies, or between members and their investment company securities, mitigate 
the flow of information that might be material and non-public. Rules can also provide guidance 
with respect to the nature of communication between brokerages and the public by regulating 
how the flow of material non-public information is released. Further, trading rules sometimes 
limit brokerage ownership, the extent to which brokerages can influence or reward employees of 
others, or ban intimidation and/or coordination activities (e.g., to stop people from reporting 
illegal activities). These restrictions can have the effect of limiting the flow of material non-
public information. 
 
2.2. Other exchange trading rules and insider trading 
 
Insider trading can be facilitated by other forms of market manipulation, such as through 
price manipulation, volume manipulation, spoofing, disclosure manipulation, and broker–agency 
conduct. 
 
Price manipulation can enable insider trading by distorting the market and prices prior to 
an announcement, thereby facilitating execution of insider trades while hindering detection of 
insider trading by surveillance authorities. Price manipulation can be carried out in many 9 
 
different ways, can take many forms, and may be executed by multiple market participants. One 
common way is where one broker (or colluding brokers) enters purchase orders at successively 
higher prices to create the appearance of active interest in a security, which is also termed 
ramping/gouging. This can also take the form of pump and dump schemes, whereby exchange 
participants generate a significant increase in price and volume for a security, carry out a quick 
flip, and the securities are then sold (often to retail customers) at the higher prices. Another 
similar type of price manipulation takes the form of pre-arranged trading. Pre-arranged trades 
involve colluding parties simultaneously entering orders at an identical price and volume. 
Because pre-arranged trades avoid the order queue, they can influence the price of a security. 
Similarly, market setting is a form of manipulation wherein brokers cross-order at the short-term 
high or low to affect the volume weighted average price, or to set the price in one market for the 
purpose of a cross in another market. Additional forms of price manipulation include corners 
(securing control of the bid- or demand-side of both the derivative and the underlying asset, and 
this dominant position can then be exploited to manipulate the price of either) and squeezes 
(taking advantage of a shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market 
congestion during such shortages in a way that creates artificial prices). Further, price 
manipulation includes mini-manipulations wherein trading in the underlying security of an 
option is carried out to manipulate its price so that the options will become in-the-money 
(Merrick et al., 2005). Price manipulation may be more pronounced at the market open or close, 
or on a particular date (end of month/quarter/year). Financial record keeping schedules among 
companies provide incentives, particularly for insider traders, to manipulate share prices around 
the end of the month/quarter/year. 
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Volume manipulation through churning and wash trades can likewise make the detection 
of insider trading more difficult for surveillance authorities. Volume manipulation can take two 
primary forms: churning and wash trading. Churning refers to excessive trading of a stock to 
inflate its volume, thereby giving rise to a false impression that there is positive investor 
sentiment for the stock. Wash trading, another form of volume manipulation, means having the 
same client reference on both sides of a trade. While there is no beneficial change in ownership, 
wash trades have the effect of creating a misleading appearance of active interest in a stock. 
 
Spoofing can be used to facilitate illegal insider trades by creating other market 
distortions that would make insider trading more difficult to detect. Spoofing, also known as 
“painting the tape”, is a form of market manipulation that involves actions taken by market 
participants to give an improper or false impression of unusual activity or price movement in a 
security. Spoofing includes fictitious orders, giving up priority, layering of bids-asks, and 
switches. Spoofing may give rise to volume and price manipulations that make insider trading 
more profitable and easier to carry out, and more difficult to detect. 
 
A market participant may also more effectively execute an insider trade by engaging in 
false disclosure, parking, and warehousing. Many exchanges stipulate rules prohibiting false 
disclosure of information. Market participants might otherwise actively distribute false or 
misleading information that has the effect of distorting the marketplace. Alternatively, there can 
be a failure to disclose information such as mandatory disclosure of ownership interests when 




Broker–agency conflicts can similarly facilitate insider trading transactions by misleading 
market participants who are not insiders. Brokers act on behalf of clients, but can do so in ways 
that are against client interests. This type of principal agent problem may arise from failure of the 
broker to obtain the best price for a client (commonly known as a breach of a trade through 
obligation
5), the broker charging excessive fees, or the broker acting in ways that are generally 
detrimental to client interests, such as by investing in securities that do not match the risk/return 
profile of the client (referred to as breach of the “know-your-client rule”). As well, brokers might 
use the exchange’s name improperly in marketing their services, or carry out other forms of 
improper or unethical sales and marketing efforts. 
 
2.3. Surveillance and insider trading 
 
As with most exchange trading platforms, surveillance systems within exchanges around 
the world are automated (Harris, 2002). Real time computer surveillance systems alert 
surveillance staff of unusual trading activity based on orders and executed trades. Such alerts are 
not usually based on single trades but are generated based on patterns of trading to detect 
potential manipulative practices. The different types of market manipulation identified in Table 1 
can be subject to both single- and cross-market surveillance. Single-market manipulations can 
also be a cross-market manipulation (such as for a security that is listed on more than one 
                                                 
     
5  In the US, this obligation was released under Regulation NMS and published in the Federal Register in 
June 2005. Regulation NMS was phased in over many months in 2007; see 
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/content/marketregulation/regnms/regnms_factsheet.pdf. Assigning the value 1 or 0 to 
trade through in the US during this period does not materially influence our results. 12 
 
exchange) or cross-product manipulation (such as a derivative and its associated stock). For 
example, wash trades may take place across markets (in fact, multiple transactions across 
markets could be used as a way to disguise wash trades). Front-running may also take place 
across markets, where brokers place orders ahead of client orders for the same security traded on 
a different exchange. 
 
In our empirical tests below, we sum up the scope of domestic and cross-market 
surveillance to create an overall scope-of-surveillance index. As with the underlying logic 
pertaining to the scope of trading rules, we expect the scope of surveillance, and not merely 
surveillance of one type of manipulative activity, to be important with respect to insider trading. 
Other surveillance index specifications within the subset of domestic or the subset of cross-
market surveillance alerts are expected to give rise to materially similar results; we also assess 
these specifications in our empirical tests. A greater scope of surveillance is expected to lower 
the profits to insider trading by making the market more efficient (Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
The scope of surveillance is not precisely known by market participants, but it may be estimated, 
and as such, surveillance by any one exchange is expected to mitigate the frequency of insider 
trading. Based on the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; see also Karpoff et al., 2008a,b), 
when there is a greater chance of detection, risk taking insiders will be willing to engage only in 
the more profitable insider trades. 
 
In sum, we conjecture that rules prohibiting insider trading alone may not necessarily 
influence insider trading, but rather, that the rules we have outlined above, along with the 
surveillance associated with these rules, operate together to jointly have greater influence on 13 
 
insider trading. More detailed rules mitigate the frequency of suspected insider trading. 
However, more detailed rules increase the expected costs of detection; based on the economic 
model of crime (Becker, 1968), insider traders will engage in insider trading only if the 
accompanying profits are larger. We test these propositions via a new, detailed panel data set, 








Our sample comprises 22 stock exchanges whose trading data are included in commonly 
used data sources such as Thomson Reuters Datastream. The sample comprises Australia, 
Canada, China (Shanghai and Shenzhen), Germany, Hong Kong, India (Bombay and the 
National Stock Exchange of India), Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK, and the US (NASDAQ and NYSE). 
 
Table 1 describes the main variables in our data set. Our main dependent variables are the 
number of suspected information leakage cases and pre-announcement abnormal profits per 
suspected information leakage case. The dependent variable is based on identified suspected 
cases from surveillance authorities via SMARTS Group, Inc., and CMCRC. SMARTS 
surveillance staff constructed the dependent variable by first examining news releases from the 14 
 
exchanges themselves. SMARTS measures the return to the security in the six days prior to the 
announcement, up through two days following the announcement. SMARTS cross checked their 
findings with the Thompson Reuters News Network to ensure that no important news 
announcements were missed. SMARTS considers only news events that have no companion 
news announcements that could alternatively explain as market anticipation price movements in 
the six days before and the two days after the relevant announcement.  
 
For each news announcement, a price movement is abnormal if it is three standard 
deviations away from the mean abnormal return during the 250-day benchmarking period ending 
10 days prior to the news release. SMARTS surveillance staff independently examined the data 
to distinguish between market anticipation and suspected insider trading;
6 since SMARTS 
includes as insider trading only large movements that are three-standard-deviation changes, the 
possibility that insider trades could be viewed as market anticipation is mitigated and not 
plausibly observed in the data. To be included in our sample, the stock must have at least 150 
days of trading activity. A one-factor market model based on the market index from each 
particular exchange is used to calculate daily abnormal returns. To ensure that no temporary 
stock fluctuations are captured, nine-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs[t-6, t-2]) are 
calculated as well . To be included in the final data set for suspected information leakage cases, 
the CAR around each event [t-6, t+2] must be three standard deviations away from the normal 
nine-day CAR during the benchmarking period for each individual stock. The abnormal profit 
per case is calculated as the total trading volume multiple abnormal returns from 6 days before to 
the day before the news announcement We standardize the number of suspected information 
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leakage cases by the number of trades per month on the exchange (scaled by a million for the 
purpose of reporting the regression results). We standardize the pre-announcement abnormal 
profits per suspected information leakage case by the average monthly trade size on each 
exchange.  Our results with these standardized dependent variables are consistent when we do 
not standardize and available in an earlier draft of this paper.     
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Trading rules for these stock exchanges are found on each exchange's webpage, with the 
sole exception of China, where the pertinent trading rules for the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchange are found on the China Securities and Regulatory Commission webpage. We use the 
trading rule indices from Cumming et al. (2011). The trading rules for a stock exchange are 
drafted with varying degrees of specificity, as they outline exchange membership requirements, 
listing requirements, trading rules and regulations, and especially prohibited trading practices. 
 
Surveillance data are taken from Cumming and Johan (2008) and updated to 2011. 
Cumming and Johan surveyed 25 exchanges around the world to ascertain the extent of single- 
and cross-market surveillance. The data were obtained confidentially, because if precise 
information about surveillance activity were made available to a would-be manipulator, such 
entity might trade in ways that would obviously not be detected. The data are based on an 
equally weighted index that adds 1 each time a different type of single- and cross-market 
manipulation is monitored. 
 16 
 
We also acquire a series of law and finance indices from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) and 
Spamann (2010), which includes measures of rule of law and efficiency of the judiciary. Other 
legal indices were considered, but they did not impact the empirical tests reported below and are 
therefore excluded for conciseness. Although we do have information on the surveillance 
mentioned immediately above, we do not have data on enforcement of the trading rules that we 
analyze in this article; nevertheless, our understanding from our data sources for surveillance in 
Cumming and Johan (2008) is that enforcement is highly correlated with surveillance. 
Otherwise, exchanges would not bother to carry out surveillance. We nevertheless proxy 
enforcement by using established indices of enforcement, such as efficiency of the judiciary. In 
other works, note that La Porta et al. (2006) find evidence that private enforcement facilitates the 
development of stock markets, while Jackson and Roe (2009) find stronger evidence of the value 
of liability standards and public enforcement (see also Roe, 2006; Jackson, 2007). The difference 
in Jackson and Roe (2009) is that these authors employ more detailed resource-based measures, 
such as budgets/GDP and staffing/population to study enforcement. These enforcement measures 
differ significantly across countries, but not over time. We considered all the indices in La Porta 
et al. (2006) and Jackson and Roe (2009); inclusion/exclusion of these indices does not 
materially affect our conclusions regarding the trading rule indices introduced herein. Similarly, 
in some countries, the probability of detection of insider trading is low, and even upon detection 
and prosecution, the ensuing fines are light (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, 2009). We 
considered separate variables for insider trading laws around the world (e.g., Beny, 2005, 2007) 
among others, but these variables did not materially impact the results presented herein. 
 17 
 
We use several exchange-level variables as controls from January 2003 through June 
2011, the period considered in this study, using data from Capital Markets CRC and Reuters. To 
control for the influence of market-specific changes, we draw from an MSCI Global Standard 
Index series from Morgan Stanley Capital International’s webpage. Also, we consider both 
exchange and year dummy variables in our multivariate analyses. 
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
 
  Table 2 provides summary statistics of the trading rule variables used in this paper. There 
are three primary legal indices introduced: the Insider Trading Rules Index, the Market 
Manipulation Rules Index, and the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index. The Market 
Manipulation Rules Index consists of four subcomponents: the Price Manipulation Rules Index, 
the Volume Manipulation Rules Index, the Spoofing Manipulation Rules Index, and the False 
Disclosure Rules Index. As discussed above, the indices are created by summing up the number 
of specific provisions in the exchange trading rules for each exchange. The Insider Trading Rules 
Index varies from a low value of 0 (for a number of exchanges listed in Table 2) to 10 (for 
NASDAQ). The Market Manipulation Rules Index varies from a low value of 2 (for Malaysia, 
Taiwan, and Tokyo) to 13 (for London and NYSE). The Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index 
varies from a low value of 0 (for Australia, Hong Kong, Germany, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Taiwan, 
Tokyo, and OSLO) to 5 (for NASDAQ). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Aside from differences in levels of rule detail across countries, few studies analyze a 
material change to trading rules across countries stemming from the Directive on Markets in 
Financial Instruments. In November 2007, MiFID, a Europe-wide harmonization directive, 
became effective. Because the timing, motivation, and content of MiFID were not instigated by a 
specific European exchange or European country, but were promulgated instead at the European 
Union level, this legislative change can be regarded as exogenous, thereby providing a useful test 
of causality between rules and liquidity. MiFID became effective November 1, 2007. While an 
earlier directive, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), was introduced in 2004, appropriate 
measures were not in place in 2004 across member states, for a number of reasons. First, 
surveillance data from Cumming and Johan (2008) indicate that exchanges in 2004 and 2005 had 
not adopted/implemented the provisions in MAD in a meaningful way. Second, MiFID covers 
many aspects of MAD, and states that provisions are needed to ensure that MAD principles are 
in place by November 1, 2007 (see, for example, Article 25 in MiFID). The draft provisions in 
MiFID in 2004 already made this point, so investors in 2004 would expect adoption of MAD at 
the time of MiFID. Third, principles in MAD were added to / clarified in MiFID for the 
implementation and definition of conduct to ensure that MAD was legally effective. Hence, 
given that the legal situation in Europe is not perfectly delineated over time, we test for market 
adoption of these principles using the November 1, 2007 date, but also test for an earlier impact 
dating back to 2004. We expect that the substantial details provided in MAD/MiFID enhanced 
investor protection and mitigated insider trading, as discussed below. 
 
Table 3 shows that the average (median) number of suspected information leakage cases 
in a month, divided by the number of trades on the exchange in that month (scaled by 19 
 
multiplying by 1 million) is 3.42 (0.17), with a range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 
124.36.
7 Distribution across countries is shown graphically in Figure 1. One standard deviation 
in the monthly number of suspected information leakage cases is 9.40. The average (median) 
pre-announcement abnormal profit (in 2011 USD) per information leakage case per month 
divided by the ratio of the total dollar volume per month per number of trades per month is 
3425.92 (248.83).
8 Table 3 also provides summary statistics for the Total Trading Rules Index, 
surveillance index, public enforcement, rule of law index, efficiency of the judiciary index, 
MSCI, and GDP per capita. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
  Table 4 sets forth a comparison of means and medians tests of the number of suspected 
information leakage cases in relation to different cutoff values, which are the median value of the 
Total Trading Rule Index. Panel A reports differences in means and medians of the number of 
suspected information leakage cases for the full sample of all exchanges in the data. The data 
indicate that the number of suspected information leakage cases is significantly greater for higher 
values in the Total Trading Rules Index. The average (median) number of suspected information 
                                                 
     
7  We scale by the number of trades to make the comparisons across markets and time more direct. Without 
scaling, we produce very similar results, which are available on request from an earlier draft of this paper. Note that 
without scaling, the average (median) number of cases per month is 10 (4) and the range is 0 to 287. 
     
8  As with the number of cases, the profits per case are scaled to make more direct comparisons across time 
and markets. Results without scaling produced nearly identical results and are available from an earlier draft of this 
paper. The raw data show the average (median) profit per case is $1.9 million ($0.8 million), with a range between 
$0 and $6.25 million profit per suspected case. 20 
 
leakage cases for all exchanges is 1.29 (0.50) for exchanges with a value of more than 11 in the 
Total Trading Rules Index. The average (median) number of suspected information leakage 
cases is 5.21 (1.56) for exchanges with values of less than or equal to 18 in the Total Trading 
Rules Index. These differences in means and medians are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A also considers differences in the Total Trading Rules Index for the subset of European 
exchanges for which MiFID applies. The results are broadly consistent with those reported for 
the whole data set. We note, however, that in both MiFID and non-MiFID countries, there were 
fewer cases post-MiFID, which gives rise to the need to test for a difference-in-differences in our 
multivariate tests below. In Table 4, we also compare the difference in means and medians for 
the Surveillance Index in Panel A of Table 4, and the results are similarly significant for the 
whole sample and the subset of MiFID exchanges. For the MIFID countries, the change is 2.62 
down to 1.46 for cases, and non-MIFID countries the change is 4.39 to 2.98. In other words, the 
percentage change is -44.3% for MIFID countries, and only -32.1% for non-MIFID countries. 
Clearly, the drop is bigger on a percentage basis for MIFID than non-MIFID countries. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
  Table 4, Panel B presents a comparison of mean and median tests for pre-announcement 
abnormal profits. Both mean and median tests of the full sample show that pre-announcement 
abnormal profit is significantly higher for exchanges with higher Total Exchange Rules Index. 
The average (median) pre-announcement abnormal profit per suspected announcement (scaled 
by the average exchange-month trade size, as defined in Table 1) for all exchanges is 7854.22 
(1333.73) for exchanges with a value of more than 11 in the Total Trading Rules Index. The 21 
 
average (median) pre-announcement abnormal profit per suspected announcement is 1201.998 
(64.51) for exchanges with a value of less or equal to 11 in the Total Trading Rules Index. The 
difference in both means and medians are statistically significant at the 1% level. For a subset 
European exchanges, the pre-announcement abnormal profit per suspected announcement is 
1154.44(225.75) for Total Trading Rules Index greater than 11, and 598.45 and 31.42 for Total 
Trading Rules Index less than or equal to 11, and these differences are significant at the 1% 
level. Similar differences in means and medians are observed for surveillance in Panel B. 
Finally, Panel B also shows that average and median pre-announcement abnormal profit is higher 
after November 2007 for MiFID exchanges and that these differences are significant at the 1% 
level; we observe similar results for the non-MiFID exchanges.  For the dollar value of trades 
surrounding insider trading, in MIFID countries the increase is 413.58 to 1676.22, or 305.3%, 
and in non-MIFID countries the increase is 4191.3 to 6288.2, or 50.0%. 
 
Overall, the comparison of means and medians in the data highlight patterns that suggest 
that detailed exchange trading rules and a broader scope of surveillance are better in terms of 
being associated with fewer insider trading cases, but worse in terms of higher profits per insider 
trading case. But this type of univariate comparison is not fully informative for the following 
reasons. First, the data are highly skewed in terms of outlier observations on some exchanges and 
some months. Differences in case numbers are particularly right-skewed on some exchanges (see 
Figure 1). To address this skewness, we winsorize our dependent variables in the regression 
analyses in the next section, and consider robustness by removing some countries from the data 
set. Second, the comparison tests do not control for all other factors being equal, particularly 
economic conditions in terms of wealth and market depth, which differ across countries. In our 22 
 
empirical tests in the next section, we account for economic conditions to isolate the unique 
marginal impact of exchange trading rules and surveillance. We highlight the results in the 
regression tables and present partial regression plots to show the effects graphically. Moreover, 
we consider robustness checks with alternative explanatory variables, as well as difference-in-
differences regressions and instrumental variable regressions, among others. 
 
  Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in section 4. The correlations highlight trends similar to those in the comparison tests. 
Further, the correlations show areas in which collinearity is potentially problematic for 
regression analyses, and as such, we present alternative specifications with and without collinear 
variables in the regressions in section 4. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4. Multivariate analyses 
 
4.1. Empirical methods 
 
In this section, we empirically test whether exchange trading rules and surveillance have 
an impact on the frequency and profitability of insider trading, while controlling for other 
economic and institutional determinants of trading activity. We consider each exchange-month 
from January 2003 through June 2011 as a separate observation across 22 exchanges in 17 
countries and cluster standard errors (as in Petersen, 2009). We use fixed effects by exchange 23 
 
and cluster by month (Model 1, difference-in-differences estimates),  cluster by exchange and 
month (Models 2, and 3,), by country and month (model 4), cluster by exchange and year 
(Models 5, 6 and 7, robustness checks), and cluster by year alone (Models 8, further robustness 
checks). Also, we consider other approaches for treating standard errors for panel data sets (e.g., 
Bertrand et al., 2004), which we find to be quite robust. 
 
Panels A and B of Table 6 examine the effect of exchange trading rules and surveillance 
on the frequency and profitability of insider trading, respectively. The dependent variable in 
Panel A is the number of suspected insider trading cases each month, excluding cases of clear 
market anticipation, divided by the number of trades in the month (scaled by 1 million, as 
defined in Table 1). The dependent variable in Panel B is the sum total of the profits from 
suspected insider trading in a market relative to the number of suspected cases, thereby giving a 
measure of profitability per case. Again, this variable is scaled by volume per trade, as defined in 
Table 1. In each of Panels A and B, we present eight identical regressions to show robustness to 
alternative specifications. Model 1 shows a difference-in-differences specification for the 
European regulatory change with trading rules with and without country fixed effect. Models 2 
and 3 separately include the trading rules index and surveillance index, respectively. Model 4 
shows the trading rule indices with a number of other legal and enforcement variables, including 
the public enforcement measures from Djankov et al. (2008) and the resource measure from 
Jackson and Roe (2009), in addition to creditors rights, investor protection, and disclosure index 
from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006). Model 5 shows the results without the US exchanges, and 
Model 6 excludes the US and Japan, since these countries are outliers (Figure 1). Model 7 
presents the second step of the two-stage instrumental variable (IV) estimation, discussed further 24 
 
below. Finally, Model 8 presents the results with different dates for the implementation of the 
European changes dating back to 2004 under MAD (discussed above). For each regression, we 
control for economic factors, including market capitalization, market conditions (MSCI index), 
GDP, and exchange institutional features (Röell, 1992), as well as exchange and year dummy 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As discussed above, the European rule changes came via a central directive, and were not 
prompted by any one country, thereby mitigating the effect of endogeneity. Nevertheless, in 
Model 7 we report two-step instrumental variable regressions for the possibility of endogeneity 
with respect to insider trading and trading rules, with legal origin variables as instruments, 
consistent with the La Porta et al. (2006) instrumental variable specifications. Diagnostic tests 
indicate that these instruments are suitably correlated with the potentially endogenous variables 
(correlation between common law and rules index=0.32), but not the left-hand-side variables for 
the number of insider trading cases (correlation=0.12) and profits per case (correlation=-0.10). 
 
4.2. Regression results 
 
  Panel A of Table 6 presents regression results for the number of suspected information 
leakages in each market. The data consistently indicate (Models 1–8 in Panel A) that exchange 
trading rules are significantly negatively related to the number of suspected information 
leakages. The effect is significant at the 5% level in Models 2 and 3, , and at the 1% level in 25 
 
Models 5, 6, 7, and 8. The economic significance in the difference-in-differences regression 
shows that the rule change in Europe gives rise to a 25.73% (=-0.88/3.42) reduction in the 
number of cases per trade relative to the average number of cases per trade. In the other 
specifications, the economic significance is such that a 1-standard-deviation change in rules 
gives rise to a reduction in the number of cases per trade from 23.43% (=-0.137*5.85/3.42) in the 
most conservative estimate (Model 2), to a 28.91% (=-0.169*-5.85/3.42) reduction in the number 
of cases per trade in the least conservative estimate.  Even after controlling for potential 
endogeneity (Model 7), the statistical significance of this effect remains and the economic 
significance of this effect is consistent with other estimates. This finding pertaining to 
endogeneity not mitigating the results is not surprising; if there were an endogenous relationship, 
we would expect a positive association, since more trading rules would be adopted in response to 
insider trading, but instead we see a negative relationship. The findings are quite similar using 
the MAD start date (Model 8). Overall, the data provide very strong support for the notion that 
more detailed trading rules significantly reduce insider trading. To highlight the significance of 
this effect graphically, we generate a partial regression plot (Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figures 2–6 about here] 
 
  As a robustness check, we consider subsets of the trading rule indices described in Table 
1 and Section 2, as well as combinations of different rule indices in the same regressions (and 
considering collinearity across indices). The index subsets are generally consistent with the Total 
Trading Rule Index. We report the Total Trading Rule Index results since, as discussed in 26 
 
Section 2, rules pertaining to market conduct, such as price and volume manipulation and the 
like, are all pertinent to the ability of an insider to effect insider trading. 
 
Consistent with the Trading Rule Index, the data indicate that surveillance is negatively 
and significantly related to the number of suspected information leakages. The economic 
significance is comparable to the effect of rules (a 1-standard-deviation increase gives rise to a 
reduction of 67.0% in Model 4 (-0.169*13.56/3.42)), as shown graphically in Figure 4. 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports regressions for the profitability of insider trading per suspected 
case. The same nine model specifications are reported as in Panel A. In Model 1, the difference-
in-differences regression shows that average profits per case (scaled by volume per trade) are 
between 49.28% (1688.4/3425.92) higher after the legal change in Europe relative to average 
profit per case, and this effect is significant at the 10% level at a minimum. The economic 
significance of the results is much stronger in the other models, and the effect is significant at the 
1% level in each of Models 2, 4, 7 and 8. The most conservative estimate is from Model 6 with 
outlier countries removed, which shows a 1-standard-deviation change increases profits per case 
by 53.17% (=311.398*5.85/3425.92), and in the least conservative case (Model 2) by 135.87% 
(=795.713*5.85/3425.92). To highlight the significance of this effect graphically, we generated a 
partial regression plot (Figure 3). This evidence is consistent with the Becker (1968) economic 
model of crime, such that the profits need to be worthwhile in view of the increased probability 
of expected detection in the presence of more rules. 
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  Panel B of Table 6 further shows that a 1-standard-deviation improvement in surveillance 
gives rise to an increase in profits per case by 120.21% (Model 4) (303.70*13.56/3425.92), and 
this effect is significant at the 5% level in Model 4. The economic significance of this effect is 
lower at 26.3% when we exclude the US data from the sample (the equivalent of Model 7 with 
the surveillance variable added, not reported but available on request). In all specifications 
reported and otherwise, the data thus strongly support the view that like rules, surveillance 
increases profits per case, consistent with the Becker (1968) model of crime.  See also Figure 5. 
 
  The control variable in Panel A for the regressions for the number of suspected insider 
trading cases shows that insider trading is less common in larger exchanges. This result is 
perhaps not surprising, as insider trading is reputed to occur more in weaker markets. Some of 
the other legal indices included as control variables are significant, but the degree of significance 
depends in part on the exclusion or inclusion of other indices, due to collinearity across different 
indices; regardless, the inclusion or exclusion of these other indices does not alter the results 
pertaining to trading rules and/or surveillance. Finally, the control variables for the regressions 
with profits per case in Panel B show evidence in all models that market capitalization is 
positively related to profits per case, which is perhaps expected since smaller markets may have 
less profitable opportunities. 
 
4.3. Additional robustness checks 
 
In the course of our empirical analyses, we carry out a number of robustness checks. 
First, instead of using total trading rules, we use subsets of the trading rules indices. For these 28 
 
regressions, the results are as follows. A 1-standard-deviation increase in the price manipulation 
index, volume manipulation index, spoofing index, false disclosure index, market manipulation 
index, or insider trading index (each defined in Table 1 and summarized in Table 2) reduces the 
number of insider trading cases by 33.37%, 33.60%, 39.28%, 3.0%, 33.56% and 10.85%, 
respectively (regressions equivalent to Model 3 in Table 6, Panel A), and increases the profits 
per case by 47.24%, 84.47%, 128.5%, 71.72%, 150.0% and 169.5%, respectively (regressions 
equivalent to Model 3 in Table 6, Panel B). Relative to the economic magnitudes reported in 
Table 6 and discussed above, therefore, the findings highlight complementarities across different 
trading rules and surveillance, and these complementarities are at least twice as important as 
stand-alone insider trading rules for predicting the frequency of insider trading cases; however, 
the complementarities are less economically important for predicting the trading value for 
surrounding the insider trading cases relative to stand-alone insider trading rules.  These and 
other specifications are available on request. 
 
Second, we consider different specifications for the dependent variables, such as without 
the use of ratios and with different ratios (such as suspected cases/announcements), different 
time periods, etc. Third, we consider alternative dates for the timing of rule changes for 
European exchanges, as discussed in Section 2 above. Fourth, we consider other measures of law 
quality, such as anti-director rights (La Porta et al., 1998; Spamann, 2010), disclosure (La Porta 
et al., 2006), and other proxies for resources devoted to securities regulation (Jackson and Roe, 
2009). Fifth, we consider other instrumental variable and difference-in-differences specifications, 
such as lagged dependent variables and other specifications. Sixth, we consider possible outlier 
time periods and outlier exchanges. These alternative models and checks, among others, do not 29 
 
suggest material differences in the array of results reported in the tables. Alternative 




In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between the frequency and 
profitability of insider trading and exchange trading rules and surveillance across 22 exchanges 
over the period January 2003 through June 2011. The ability of an exchange to mitigate insider 
trading activity and profits from insider trading depend significantly on the overall rule structure 
of the exchange and its domestic and cross-market surveillance. The scope of exchange trading 
rules is precisely known by market participants, since they are prominent on each exchange’s 
webpage. The scope of surveillance, by contrast, is not precisely known,
9 but can only be 
estimated by market participants. Rules and surveillance, therefore, have the potential to 
exacerbate crime according to the Becker economic model of crime (commit a crime if the 
expected benefits exceed the costs). 
 
The data examined herein are strongly consistent with the view that more detailed 
exchange trading rules and surveillance reduce the number of cases of market manipulation, as 
would-be manipulators are less likely to engage in insider trading where there are fewer ways to 
hide such trades. The data indicate that rules and surveillance, ceteris paribus, exacerbate the 
profits to insider trading, since would-be manipulators are likely to engage in insider trading only 
                                                 
     
9  If market participants knew exactly what surveillance authorities did and did not have alerts (computer 
algorithms) for, then they could trade in precise ways to avoid detection.  30 
 
if the expected profits outweigh the expected costs, and the greater the number of rules and the 
broader the scope of surveillance the greater the expected costs. These findings are robust to 
many alternative specifications and highlight the importance of trading rules and surveillance in 
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Figure 1. Three-dimensional graph comparison of Average Number of Suspected Information Leakage Cases, Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profit, and Total Trading Rules Index by 
exchange. Data involve monthly data from 22 exchanges in 17 countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South 





Figure 2. Partial regression plot of Average Suspected Information Leakage Case and Average Total Trading Rules Index. The dependent 
variable is winsorized at 95% before taking the average by exchange. Independent variables include rule of law index, efficiency of judiciary, log 







Figure 3. Partial regression plot of Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profits and Average Total Trading Rules Index. The 
dependent variable is winsorized at 95% before taking the average by exchange. Independent variables include rule of law index, efficiency of the 






Figure 4. Partial regression plot of Average Suspected Information Leakage Case and Average Surveillance Index. The dependent variable 
is winsorized at 95% before taking the average by exchange. Independent variables include rule of law index, efficiency of judiciary, log of lag 







Figure 5. Partial regression plot of Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profits and Average Surveillance Index. The dependent 
variable is winsorized at 95% before taking the average by exchange. Independent variables include rule of law index, efficiency of judiciary, log 




Table 1.  
Definition of Variables. 
This table defines our independent, dependent, and control variables.  
Variable Name  Definition 
Market Quality 
   
Average Number of Suspected 
Information Leakage Cases 
Total number of announcements with suspected pre-announcement insider trading cases per month divided by the number of 
trades per month on the exchange (scaled by multiplying by 1 million). Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre 
(CMCRC) and SMARTS, Inc.* 
Average Pre-Announcement 
Abnormal Profits  
Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profit per Information Leakage Case divided by average monthly trade size on the exchange. 
Source: CMCRC and SMARTS Group Pty, Ltd.* 
 
* CMCRC and SMARTS surveillance staff constructed these two dependent variables. CMCRC and SMARTS first examined 
all news releases from the exchanges themselves. CMCRC and SMARTS measured the return to the security in the six days 
prior to the announcement up to the two days after the announcement. They double checked the Thompson Reuters News 
Network to ensure that they did not miss any important news announcements. They consider only news events that have no 
companion news announcements that could explain price movements in the six days before and the two days after the relevant 
announcement that could explain the price movement. For each news announcement, a price movement is abnormal if it is three 
standard deviations away from the mean abnormal return during the 250-day benchmarking period ending at 10 days before the 
news release. To be included in our sample, the stock must have at least 150 days’ trading activities. A one-factor market model 
based on the market index for each exchange is used to calculate daily abnormal returns. To be included in the final data set as a 
suspected information leakage case, the CAR around each event over the period [t-6, t+2] must be three standard deviations 
away from the normal nine-day CAR for each individual stock. Once the suspected information leakage case is defined, 
abnormal profit per case is calculated as the trading-volume-multiple abnormal returns from six days before to the day before the 
news announcement. SMARTS surveillance staff independently examined the data to distinguish between market anticipation 
and suspected insider trading; since SMARTS includes as insider trading only large movements that are three-standard-deviation 
changes, the possibility that insider trades could be viewed as market anticipation is mitigated. 
Trading Rule Index  
Insider Trading Rules Index 
Sum of dummy variables for Front-running, Client precedence, Trading ahead of research reports, Separation of research and 
trading, Broker ownership limit, Restrictions on affiliation, Restrictions on communications, Investment company securities, 
Influencing or rewarding the Employees of Others, and Anti-intimidation / Coordination. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Price Manipulation Rules Index 
Sum of dummy variables for marking the open, marking the close, misleading end of the month/quarter/year trades, intraday 
ramping/gouging, market setting, pre-arranged trades, and domination and control. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Volume Manipulation Rules 
Index 
Sum of dummy variables for Churning and Wash trade. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Spoofing Rules Index 
Sum of dummy variables for Giving up priority, Switch and Layering of bids/asks. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
False Disclosure Rules Index 
Sum of dummy variables for Dissemination of false and misleading information and Parking or warehousing. Source: Cumming 
et al. (2011). 
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Market Manipulation Rules 
Index 
Sum of Price Manipulation Rules Index, Volume Manipulation Rules Index, Spoofing Rules Index, and False Disclosure Rules 




Sum of dummy variables for Trade through, Improper execution, and Restrictions on member use of exchange name, 
Restrictions on sales materials and telemarketing, and Fair dealing with customers. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Total Trading Rules Index 
Sum of Insider Trading Rules Index, Market Manipulation Rules Index, and Broker-Agency Rules Index. Source: Cumming et 
al. (2011). 
Surveillance, Enforcement, 
Efficiency of the Judiciary, Rule of 
Law Indices and Other Law and 
Finance Indices 
 
Rule of Law Indices 
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk 
(ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with 
lower scores for less tradition of law and order (we changed the scale from its original range from 0 to 6). Original data come 
from International Country Risk Guide. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Surveillance Index 
The principal component of (1) single-market surveillance and (2) cross-market surveillance. Source: Cumming and Johan 
(2008). Available for a subset of countries, and provided contingent on maintaining confidentiality and anonymity, as exchanges 
do not want market participants to know all of the things they do and do not look for in their surveillance. Source: Cumming et 
al. (2011). 
 
Efficiency of the Judiciary 
Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms” produced 
by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR).t “may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of 
conditions in the country in question.” Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower scores, lower efficiency 
levels assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower scores, lower 
efficiency levels. Original data come from International Country Risk Guide.  Source: La Porta et al. (2006). 
Staff per Million Population 
(extrapolated sample) 
The 2005 size of the securities regulator’s staff, divided by the country’s population in millionsOrignial data come from 
regulators' annual report and nations' official document.  Population data are from World Bank Data and Statistics Web site.. 
Source: Jackson and Roe (2009). 
DLLS Public Enforcement Index 
Public enforcement is an index aggregating whether certain suspect corporate transactions can lead to a fine or jail sentences for 
the approving body, or fine or jail sentence for the principal wrongdoer. Source: Jackson and Roe (2009); Original source: 
Djankov et al. (2008). 
Creditor Rights 
An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditor consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the 
distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the 





ICR’s assessment of corruption in government. Lower scores indicate that “high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.” Average of the 
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher 
levels of corruption. The index ranges from zero to four. Original data come from International Country Risk Guide. Source: La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Risk of Expropriation 
ICR’s assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” Average of the months of April and October 
of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher risks. Original data come from 
International Country Risk Guide. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Accounting Standard 
Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items 
fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, 
stock data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in each country were studied. The companies represent a cross-
section of various industry groups; industrial companies represented 70%, and financial companies represented the remaining 
30%. Original data come from international accounting and auditing trends, Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Investor Protection 




The Index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of (1) prospectus; (2) compensation; (3) shareholders; (4) inside ownership; 




The updated Anti-director Rights index.   Source: Spamann (2010). 
 
Market Statistics   
Log (Market Capitalization)  Log of domestic market capitalization in USD millions.  Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Log (1+MSCI)  Log of 1one plus the MSCI index in the 1-month lagged period. Source: MSCI.COM (2003/01-2011/06). 
Log (GDP)  Log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Source: Global Insight. (2003/01-2011/06). 
   






Trading Rule Indices 
 
This table summarizes the index values for the trading rules for each exchange, as defined in Table 1. Panel A presents the Trading Rule Index values for post-MiFID 
(Nov. 2007–Jun. 2011; and in brackets are values for Jan. 2003–Oct. 2007). Panel B compares the mean of Trading Rule Index among different legal origins. Cochran 
and Cox (1950) t-statistics are shown in Panel B and *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 























English Legal Origin              
Australia  3 (3)  1 (1)  2 (2)  0 (0)  6 (6)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Bombay  0 (0)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  3 (3)  2 (2)  3 (3) 
Canada  7 (7)  2 (2)  3 (3)  0 (0)  12 (12)  2 (2)  1 (1) 
Hong Kong  3 (3)  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  7 (7)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
India NSE  3 (3)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  6 (6)  3 (3)  3 (3) 
London (LSE and ChiX London)  7 (6)  2 (2)  3 (3)  1 (1)  13 (12)  3 (2)  0 (0) 
Malaysia  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (1)  1 (1)  2 (2)  7 (7)  2 (2) 
NASDAQ  5 (5)  1 (1)  3 (3)  2 (2)  11 (11)  10 (10)  5 (5) 
New Zealand  2(2) 0  (0)  1(1)  1(1)  4(4) 3(3)  3(3) 
NYSE  6 (6)  2 (2)  3 (3)  2 (2)  13 (13)  7 (7)  3 (3) 
Singapore  3 (3)  1 (1)  2 (2)  1 (1)  7 (7)  2 (2)  2 (2) 
              
Average English Legal Origin  3.83 (3.67)  1.25 (1.25)  2.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  8.08 (7.92)  3.67 (3.50)  1.83 (1.83) 
Median English Legal Origin  3.00 (3.00)  1.00 (1.00)  2.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  7.00 (7.00)  3.00 (2.00)  2.00 (2.00) 
              
German Legal Origin              
Germany  7 (0)  1 (0)  3 (1)  1 (0)  12 (1)  3 (2)  0 (1) 
Korea (KOSPI and KOSDAQ)  4 (4)  2 (2)  2 (2)  1 (1)  9 (9)  3 (3)  2 (2) 
Shanghai  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  5 (5)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Shenzhen  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  5 (5)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Switzerland  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (1)  1 (1)  12 (5)  3 (2)  1 (1) 
Taiwan  2 (2)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  2 (2)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Tokyo  1 (1)  0 (0)  1 (1)  0 (0)  2 (2)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
              
Average German Legal Origin  3.63 (2.13)  1.00 (0.88)  1.63 (1.13)  0.75 (0.63)  7.00 (4.75)  2.13 (1.88)  0.63 (0.75) 
Median German Legal Origin  3.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  1.50 (1.00)  1.00 (1.00)  7.00 (5.00)  2.50 (2.00)  0.00 (0.50) 
 
 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 
            
OMX (Sweden)  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (2)  1 (1)  12 (6)  5 (4)  2 (2) 
OSLO (Norway)  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (1)  1 (0)  12 (4)  4 (3)  0 (0) 
              
Average Scandinavian Legal Origin  7.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  3.00 (1.50)  1.00 (0.50)  12.00 (5.00)  4.50 (3.50)  1.00 (1.00) 
Median Scandinavian Legal Origin  7.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  3.00 (1.50)  1.00 (0.50)  12.00 (5.00)  4.50 (3.50)  1.00 (1.00) 





Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Panel B Comparison Tests: 
 



































              














              














              


















Table 3.             
Descriptive Statistics            
 
This table presents statistics for the full sample of country-month observations in the data. The data span the months from January 2003–June 
2011, and the exchanges listed in Table 2. The full number of exchange-months in the data is 2196, but some variables have missing values. 
Surveillance data are available for select countries from Cumming and Johan (2008) with updated information up to 2011, as indicated in 
Table 1. Index from La Porta (1998, 2006) is not available for China. Market Capitalization is from CMCRC with some missing data in the 
early portion of 2003. 
      Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum  Number of 
Observations 
(1)  Average Number of Suspected 
Information Leakage Case  3.42 0.17  9.40  0.00  124.36  2196 
(2)  Average Pre-Announcement 
Abnormal Profit  3425.92 248.83  8723.73  0.00  71504.02  2196 
(3)  Total Trading Rules Index  11.48  11  5.85  2.00  26.00  2196 
(4) Surveillance  Index  18.54  14.00 13.56  3.00  41.00  2196 
(5)  Rule of Law (LLSV, 1998)  8.32  8.98  2.01  4.17  10.00  1992 
(6)  Creditors’ Rights (LLSV, 1998)  2.62  3.00  1.19  1.00  4.00  1992 
(7)  Risk of Expropriation (LLSV, 1998)  9.17  9.40  0.79  7.75  9.98  1992 
(6)  Accounting Standard (LLSV, 1998)  69.55  70.00  7.18  57.00  83.00  1992 
(9)  Disclosure (LLS, 2006)  0.79  0.75  0.16  0.42  1.00  1992 
(10)  Corruption Index (LLSV, 1998)  8.08  8.52  1.82  4.52  10.00  1992 
(11)  Efficiency of the Judiciary (LLS, 
2006)  9.08 10.00  1.37  6.00  10.00  1992 
(12)  Investor Protection (LLS, 2006)  0.62  0.73  0.27  0.00  1.00  1992 
(13) Anti-director  (Spamann,  2010)  4.18  4.00  1.03  2.00  6.00  1992 
(14)  Public Enforcement (Jackson and 
Roe, 2009)  20.52 12.53  19.42  0.43  77.74  1992 
(15)  Public Enforcement (DLLS, 2008)  0.47  0.50  0.42  0.00  1.00  1992 
(16) Log  GDP  9.57  10.20  1.39  6.14  11.44  2196 
(17) Log  MSCI  0.009  0.014  0.07  -0.41  0.31  2138 




Table 4                        
                      
Comparison Tests                   
This table presents the comparison of mean and median tests for Average Number of Suspected Information Leakage Cases (Panel A) and Average Pre-
Announcement Abnormal Profit (Panel B). Each Panel considers all exchanges in the data set, the subset of exchanges for which the Directive on 
Markets in Financial Instrument (MiFID) applies, and the last panel considers pre- versus post-MiFID for the subsample of MiFID and non-MiFID 
exchanges. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Average Number of Suspected Information Leakage Cases    Panel B: Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profits  
  Total Trading 
Index    Total Trading 
Index       Total Trading Index    Total Trading Index 
      >11  ≤11    >11  ≤11          >11  ≤11     >11  ≤11 
     All Countries     Subset of MiFID 
Exchange         All Countries     Subset of MiFID 
Exchange 
Group     1   0         1        0    Group     1   0           1           0 
Number of 
Observations  1002 1194    346  116   
Number of 
Observations  1002 1194   346  116 
Mean   1.29  5.21    2.10  1.98    Mean    7854..22 1201.998   1154.44  598.45 
Standard 
Deviation  2.75 12.22    3.84  4.15   
Standard 
Deviation 
23446.59 5487.16   4197.02  2245.30 
Median   0.50 1.56    1.13 0.58    Median    1333.73 64.51   225.75  31.42 
Difference in 
Means (0-1)  10.75***   -0.27   
Difference in 
Means (0-1)   -8.78***    -1.81* 
Difference in 
Medians (0-1)  P<0.01***    P=0.01***   
Difference in 
Medians (0-1)  P<0.01***     P<0.01*** 
                          
   Surveillance    Surveillance      Surveillance    Surveillance 
      >14  ≤14    >14  ≤14          >14  ≤14     >14  ≤14 
     All Countries     Subset of MiFID 
Exchange         All Countries     Subset of MiFID 
Exchange 
                                 
Number of 
Observations  1074 1122    258  204   
Number of 
Observations  1074  1122    258      204 
Mean   1.31  5.44    0.86  3.59    Mean    7000.32 1592.49  1295.19  660.28 
Standard 
Deviation  2.26 12.64    0.79  5.46   
Standard 
Deviation 
22731.93 5959.32   3935.16  3618.56 
Median   0.50 1.63    0.62 2.00    Median    553.51 169.34    363.15  54.93 
Difference in 
Means (0-1)  10.76***   7.05***  
Difference in 
Means (0-1)  -7.55***   -1.80* 
Difference in 
Medians (0-1)  P<0.01***    P<0.01***   
Difference in 
Medians (0-1)  P<0.01***     P<0.01*** 
                                           
                                           
  
Non-MiFID 
Countries   MiFID  Countries     
Non-MiFID 




















Observations  748 986    220 242   
Number of 
Observations  748 986    220  290 
Mean   2.98  4.39    1.46  2.62   Mean    6288.18 4191.38   1676.22  413.58 
Standard 
Deviation  9.70 10.79    1.99  5.01   
Standard 
Deviation 
13444.8 21625.83   5187.16  1587.66 
Median   0.52  1.17    0.83  1.27    Median    919.10 145.98    367.72  62.37 
Difference in 
Means (0-1)   2.86***    3.33***   
Difference in 
Means (0-1)    -2.49**    -3.47*** 
Difference in 
Medians (0-1)  P<0.01***     P=0.09*   
Difference in 







This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample of exchange-months in the data. *  indicates correlations are statistically significant at least in the 5% levels. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13)  (14)  (15) (16)  (17) 
(1) 
Average Number of 
Suspected Information 
Leakage Cases 





-0.0821* 1                        
(3)  Total Trading Rules 
Index  -0.132* 0.301*  1                      
(4) Surveillance  Index  -0.260*  0.254*  0.582*  1 
(5)  Rule of Law (LLSV, 
1998)  0.106* 0.00152 0.164*  0.126*  1                    
(6)  Efficiency of the 
Judiciary (LLS, 2006)  0.174* -0.0675* 0.166*  -0.142* 0.725*  1                  
(7)  Public Enforcement 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009)  0.118* -0.027  0.0527*  -0.0689*  0.288*  0.362*  1                
(8)  Public Enforcement 
(DLLS, 2008)  0.01 -0.126*  -0.0533*  -0.415*  0.00987  0.0105  0.0917*  1               
(9)  Creditors’ Rights 
(LLSV, 1998)  0.108* -0.148* -0.268* -0.171*  -0.673*  -0.242* 0.0937*  0.0282  1              
(10)  Risk of Expropriation 
(LLSV, 1998)  0.0346 0.0582* 0.266*  0.280* 0.897*  0.602* 0.0810* -0.0536*  -0.651*  1             
(11)  Corruption Index 
(LLSV, 1998)  0.147* -0.0602* 0.145* 0.0658* 0.940* 0.795*  0.285*  0.141* -0.490* 0.834*  1            
(12)  Investor Protection 
(LLS, 2006)  -0.0354  0.110*  0.387*  0.0687* 0.0274 0.291*  0.487*  -0.345* -0.0301  -0.0991*  -0.0283  1          
(13)  Disclosure (LLS, 2006)  -0.0239  0.136*  0.340*  0.0700*  -0.244*  0.0603*  0.472*  -0.346*  0.159*  -0.300*  -0.291*  0.894*  1 
(14)  Anti-director (Spamann, 
2010)  0.039 -0.135*  -0.481*  -0.105*  -0.460*  -0.613*  -0.180* -0.0149  0.445*  -0.387*  -0.382*  -0.454*  -0.316*  1      
(15)  Log Market 
Capitalization  -0.195* 0.0890* -0.127*  0.219* -0.380*  -0.321*  -0.411*  -0.557* 0.136* -0.183*  -0.384*  -0.108* 0.0546* 0.413*  1    
(16)  Log  (1+MSCI)  -0.0570* -0.0307  -0.0398  -0.0263 -0.0386  -0.0291 -0.000987  0.0425  0.0148 -0.0424 -0.0357  -0.00507  0.000507  0.00694 -0.0103  1 





              
This table presents panel regression of determinants of market quality. Variables are as defined in Table 1. Panel A presents regression results for the Average Number of Suspected Information Leakage Cases 
and Panel B presents regression results for Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profits. Model 1 presents results of a difference-in-difference measure. Model 2 presents a regression results with Total 
Trading Rules Index. Model 3 presents the results with Surveillance Index. Model 4 presents the results with Total Trading Rules Index with various law and enforcement indexes. Models 5 and 6 present the 
regressions after removing the data from exchanges from the US and Japan, respectively. Model 7 presents the second-stage regression from a two-stage Least Square panel regression. In addition, we define 




Panel A: Average Number of Suspected Information Leakage Cases 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Difference-in-
Difference 
Total Trading Rules 
Index  Surveillance  Total Trading Rules 










Constant  7.976 6.292  25.134  19.917 -1.340 5.366  12.75***  12.75* 
[1.57] [0.69]  [1.34]  1.04]  [-0.13] [0.37] [4.91]  [2.17] 
Difference-in-Difference 
Treat  -6.284*** 
[-8.05] 
Treat*After  -0.880* 
[-1.87] 
After  -0.235 
[-0.63] 
Trading Rules and Surveillance 
Total Trading Rules Index  -0.137**  -0.153*  -0.147*** -0.117** -0.177***  -0.247*** 
[-2.10]  [-1.72]  [-3.29] [-2.25] [-5.72]  [-5.22] 
Surveillance  -0.169** 
[-2.42] 
Law and Enforcement Index 
Rule of Law (LLSV, 1998)  0.846 -0.224  -0.378 
[0.86] [-0.40]  [-1.42] 
Efficiency of  the Judiciary (LLS, 2006)  0.266 0.32  1.196**  1.049  0.754***  1.107*** 
[0.39]  [0.63]  [2.17] [1.49] [6.14]  [3.96] 
Creditors Rights (LLSV, 1998)  1.439 0.605 
[1.36] [0.98] 
Public Enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009)  -0.013 -0.07 
[-0.26] [-01.13] 
Public Enforcement (DLLS, 2008)  -4.419 -4.563 
[-1.26] [-1.49] 
Corruption Index (LLSV, 1998)  2.072** -0.031 -0.07 
[2.34] [-0.05]  [0.11] 
Investor Protection (LLS, 2006)  -15.38** -12.009***  -11.075*** 
[-2.31] [-4.63]  [-3.09] 
Disclosure (LLS, 2006)  32.57** 21.356***  19.951*** 
[2.34] [6.08]  [4.78 
Risk of Expropriation (LLSV, 1998)  -1.391 
[-0.81] 
Anti-director (Spamann, 2010)  1.260 
[1.14] 
Exchange and Country Control Variables 
Log Market Capitalization  -0.367 0.751  -1.265*  -0.569**  -0.723**  -0.460***  -0.560*** 
[-1.44  [-1.24]  [-1.81]  [-2.36] [-2.15] [-7.40]  [-3.49] 
Log (1+MSCI)  -4.979*  -5.849 -5.149* -4.886  -5.973*  -6.126  -2.292  -1.984 
[-1.82] [-1.56  [-1.70]  [-1.67]  [-1.80] [-1.85] [-0.99]  [-0.78] 
Log GDP per Capita  0.168  -0.359 0.534 -0.039  0.332  0.300  -0.0978  0.254 
[0.36]  [-0.86] [0.63] [-0.06]  [0.69  [0.64]  [-0.78]  [0.83] 
Fixed  Effect  Exchange  No No No  No  No  Exchange/Year  Year 
Cluster Month  Exchange/Month  Exchange/Month  Country/Month  Exchange/Year  Exchange/Year  Year  Year 
Observations  2138  1916 1916 1916  1712  1610  1910  1916 
R-squared  0.192  0.1107  0.142  0.181  0.108 0.114 0.100  0.125 49 
 
Panel B: Average Pre-Announcement Abnormal Profits 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Difference-in-
Difference 
Total Trading Rules 
Index  Surveillance  Total Trading Rules 











Constant  -140501.3***  -10812.1 -4264.67 -5661.82  -10843.4  -23060.4  -25788.4***  -23025.2*** 
[-12.22] [0.95]  [-0.18]  [-0.35]  [-1.03] [-1.02] [-3.98]  [-5.72] 
Difference-in-Difference 
Treat  -19246.9*** 
[-4.11] 
Treat*After  1688.4* 
[1.88] 
After  -4400.4*** 
[-3.78] 
Trading Rules and Surveillance 
Total Trading Rules Index  795.713*** 674.31***  379.80**  311.398**  1229.4***  890.6*** 
[3.70] [5.50]  [2.29]  [2.08]  [15.95]  [6.11] 
Surveillance  303.70** 
[2.29] 
Law and Enforcement Index 
Rule of Law (LLSV, 1998)  -1441.86*  393.7* 
[-1.94]  [2.19] 
Efficiency of  the Judiciary (LLS, 2006)  -548.92 -157.77  -1729.03*  -1377.26  -1505.5***  -1872.2*** 
[-0.71] [-0.09]  [-1.69  [-1.29]  [-4.92]  [-3.69] 
Creditors Rights (LLSV, 1998)  -2498.66 -1947.07*** 
[-2.63] [-6.28] 
Public Enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009)  -4.447 6.39 
[-0.08] [0.154] 
Public Enforcement (DLLS, 2008)  -429.37 -1800.87 
[0.18] [-0.80] 
Corruption Index (LLSV, 1998)  -2149.8*** 80.0.821  78.447 
[-4.463] [0.14] [0.12] 
Investor Protection (LLS, 2006)  -13132.8*** -3746.46  -6162.97 
[-3.55] [-0.80]  [-0.97] 
Disclosure (LLS, 2006)  16846.46* 5252.287 8592.34 
[1.86] [0.72  [0.96] 
Risk of Expropriation (LLSV, 1998)  -819.09 
[-0.83] 
Anti-director (Spamann, 2010)  -2286.77*** 
[-3.18] 
Exchange and Country Control Variables 
Log Market Capitalization  541.964* 60.852  459.67  525.62*  772.291  704.5***  809.0*** 
[1.92] [0.08] [0.74]  [1.95]  [1.50]  [4.55]  [8.71] 
Log (1+MSCI)  -3653.9  -4607.27  -.5772.87  -4191.2*** -4137.1* -4092.72  -2594.8 -3380.6 
[-1.12]  [-1.47] [-1.42] [-2.83]  [-1.69]  [-1.64]  [-0.45]  [-0.93] 
Log GDP per Capita  15412.8*** 1303.77**  602.26  2343.79***  675.262  808.799  607.7*  484.1 
[11.24]  [2.10] [0.75] [5.55]  [1.24  [1.31]  [1.95]  [1.64] 
Fixed  Effect  Exchange  No No No  No  No  Exchange/Year  Year 
Cluster Month  Exchange/Month  Exchange/Month  Country/Month  Exchange/Year  Exchange/Year  Year  Year 
Observations  2138  1916 1916 1916  1712  1610  1916  1916 




Appendix: Overview of Related Studies on Insider Trading 
Author(s)  Data Source(s)  Country Samples  Time 
Period 
Dependent 









Monetary Fund (IMF), 






Equity  Insider Trading Law and Enforcement are from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
This paper provides both 
theoretically and empirically 
arguments that sometimes no 
securities law may be better than a 
good securities law that is not 
enforced.  The authors find that the 
cost of equity rises when some 
countries enact an insider trading 
law but do not enforce it. 
Beny (2005, 
2007) 
La Porta et al. (1998, 




Stamp and Welsh 
(1996),  








Insider Trading Law index equals the sum of (1) Tipping, (2) Tippee, (3) Damages and (4) Criminal or , 
equivalently, the sum of Scope and Sanction.  Insider Trading Law variables (Tipping, Tippee, Damages, 
Criminal, Scope and Sanction) are from Gaillard (1992) and Stamp and Welsh (1996).   
 
Enforcement variables are Enforced by 1994 (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002), Public Enforcement Power 
(La Porta et al., 2003), and Private Right (Gaillard, 1992; Stamp and Welsh, 1996). 
Countries with more prohibitive 
formal insider trading laws are 
associated with more dispersed 
equity ownership, more informative 
stock prices and more liquidity 
stock markets. Both enforceability 
and formal insider trading laws 
have positive impact on stock 
market development. 
Bris (2005)  SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database 
4,541 acquisitions 







Insider Trading Law and their Enforcement: initial prosecution data are from Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) 
Insider trading enforcement 
increases both the incidence, and 
the profitability of insider trading. 
Harsher laws reduce the incidence 









Monetary Fund (IMF), 







 Survey Approach [Email, letter and Fax to 103 stock exchanges and their regulator on whether or not the 
stock market has insider trading laws and on whether or not there had been a prosecution under the insider 
trading laws] 
Introduction of insider trading law 
has no impact on the cost of equity 
in a country, but the enforcement of 
insider trading laws is associated 
with a significant decrease in the 
cost of equity. 
Seyhun 








Changes in Insider Trading Regulation: (1) March 1980, when the Chiarella decision was announced; (2) 
August 1984, when ITSA was signed into Law, and (3) November 1988, when ITSFEA was signed into law.  
The increased statutory sanctions in 
the 1980s on corporate insider-
trading has no impact on corporate 
insider trading activities and profit. 
The enforcements by courts have 
negative impact on insider trading 
activities, especially around earning 





Appendix (Continued): Overview of Related Studies on Insider Trading 
Author(s) Data  Source(s) Country Samples  Time Period  Dependent 
Variables  Insider Trading Law and Enforcement  Main Findings 
Our paper 
SMARTS, Inc., Capital 
Markets CRC, 
Cumming and Johan 
(2008)’s survey data, 
Cumming, Johan and Li 
(2011) exchange trading 
rules indices, La Porta 
et al. (1998, 2006) law 
and finance indices, 



















Insider trading index: Sum of dummy variables for Front-running, Client precedence, Trading ahead of research 
reports, Separation of research and trading, Broker ownership limit, Restrictions on affiliation, Restrictions on 
communications, Investment company securities, Influencing or rewarding the Employees of Others, and Anti-
intimidation / Coordination. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Price Manipulation Rule Index: Sum of dummy variables for marking the open, marking the close, misleading end of 
the month/quarter/year trades, intraday ramping/gouging, market setting, pre-arranged trades, and domination and 
control. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Volume Manipulation Rule Index: Sum of dummy variables for Churning and Wash trade. Source: Cumming et al. 
(2011). 
 
Spoofing Rules Index: Sum of dummy variables for Giving up priority, Switch and Layering of bids/asks. Source: 
Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
False Disclosure Rules Index: Sum of dummy variables for Dissemination of false and misleading information and 
Parking or warehousing. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Market Manipulation Rules Index: Sum of Price Manipulation Rules Index, Volume Manipulation Rules Index, 
Spoofing Rules Index, and False Disclosure Rules Index. Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Broker Agency Rules Index: Sum of dummy variables for Trade through, Improper execution, and Restrictions on 
member use of exchange name, Restrictions on sales materials and telemarketing, and Fair dealing with customers. 
Source: Cumming et al. (2011). 
 
Total Trading Rules Index: Sum of Insider Trading Index, Market Manipulation Rules Index, and Broker-Agency 




Surveillance Index: The principal component of (1) single-market surveillance and (2) cross-market surveillance. 
Source: Cumming and Johan (2008). Available for a subset of countries, and provided contingent on maintaining 
confidentiality and anonymity, as exchanges do not want market participants to know all of the things they do and do 
not look for in their surveillance. Source: Cumming et al. (2011) 
 
Efficiency of the Judiciary: Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign firms” produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR).t 
“may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in question.” Average between 1980 
and 1983. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower scores, lower efficiency levels assessment of the efficiency and integrity of 
the legal environment. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower scores, lower efficiency levels. Original data come from 
International Country Risk Guide.  Source: La Porta et al. (2006). 
 
Staff Per Million: The 2005 size of the securities regulator’s staff, divided by the country’s population in millions 
Original data come from regulators' annual report and nations' official document.  Population data are from World 
Bank Data and Statistics Web site.. Source: Jackson and Roe (2009). 
 
DLLS Public Enforcement: Public enforcement is an index aggregating whether certain suspect corporate 
transactions can lead to a fine or jail sentences for the approving body, or fine or jail sentence for the princi*pal 
wrongdoer. Source: Jackson and Roe (2009); Original source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
 
Other LLSV Variables Used as summarized in Table 1 of our paper. 
We show that more detailed 
exchange trading rules and 
surveillance over time and 
across markets significantly 
reduce the number of cases, 
but increase the profits per 
case.   
 
Overall, the findings 
highlight complementarities 
across different trading rules 
and surveillance, and these 
complementarities are at 
least twice as important as 
stand-alone insider trading 
rules for predicting the 
frequency of insider trading 
cases; however, the 
complementarities are less 
economically important for 
predicting the trading value 
for surrounding the insider 
trading cases relative to 
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